Attribute substitution is a cognitive process in which an individual replaces a complex, difficult-to-assess attribute with a simpler, more readily available heuristic one. This is a psychological process thought to underlie a number of cognitive biases and play a significant role in the field of psychology and decision-making theory.
This substitution is believed to happen in the automatic intuitive judgment system, rather than the self-aware reflective system. As a result, when someone tries to answer a tough question, they may accidentally answer a related but different subject, unaware that a replacement has occurred.
Key points concerning attribute substitution include:
- It often involves heuristics, which are mental shortcuts that can facilitate faster decision-making but may lead to systematic errors or biases.
- It exemplifies how judgments (of a target attribute) and decisions might be shaped more by the substitutable attributes rather than by the ones that are relevant and objective to the question at hand.
- The process can be seen as stemming from the dual-system theory in psychology, which divides thought processes into two systems: the fast, automatic, and intuitive System 1, and the slow, deliberate, and rational System 2.
Examples of attribute substitution can be observed across various scenarios, from judging the probability of an event based on how easily examples come to mind—which can lead to the availability heuristic—to estimating the value of an item based on its appearance, rather than its actual worth.
Historical Background
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky are pivotal figures who significantly contributed to the understanding of attribute substitution. Kahneman’s work, in particular, encompassed judgment and decision-making under uncertainty, for which he received the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2002. Tversky, though having passed away before the Nobel was awarded, was an essential collaborator with Kahneman, and together they developed prospect theory, which underpins much of the exploration of attribute substitution.
A cornerstone experiment conducted by Kahneman and Tversky was the “Linda Problem”, which illustrated how individuals frequently rely on representativeness rather than logical reasoning. Another scholar, Shane Frederick, extended the examination of attribute substitution through the creation of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), which further explored the tension between intuition and reflection in decision-making. This test demonstrated that people often favor intuitive answers instead of engaging in more effortful thinking.
In 1975, Stanley Smith Stevens, known for his work on the theory of measurement and psychophysics, influenced the understanding of how people perceive and evaluate magnitudes, an essential aspect of how attribute substitution occurs, though his work predated the term attribute substitution itself.
Attribute Substitution Heuristic Examples
Attribute substitution helps to understand why certain perceptual illusions endure. For example, when participants estimate the size of two persons in a perspective image, the 3D background might alter their apparent sizes, creating a compelling optical illusion.
According to the theory, the figure’s three-dimensional size (which is accessible because it is computed automatically by the visual system) replaces its two-dimensional size on the page. Experienced painters and photographers are less prone to this illusion since they can perceive two-dimensional size better.
Current Experience and Generalization
The tendency to generalize from current experience can lead individuals to overlook broader data sets and make instant judgments. This process of attribute substitution extends to various settings in everyday life where people draw on personal experiences to inform their understanding of general patterns.
For instance, someone might judge the safety of a neighborhood not on crime statistics, but on a recent news story or a singular personal encounter. These generalizations can be useful for quick decisions, yet they may not always reflect the true nature of a situation.
Fairness and Morality
The legal scholar Cass Robert Sunstein stated that attribute substitution is common when people think about moral, political, or legal issues. When faced with a difficult, unique difficulty in these domains, people look for a more familiar, related problem (a “prototypical case”) and use its solution to solve the harder problem.
When people are asked to express their own ideas on a topic, Sunstein believes that the opinions of trusted political or religious authority might function as heuristics. Emotion is another source of heuristic attributes: people’s moral attitudes on sensitive topics such as sexuality and human cloning may be motivated by feelings of disgust rather than rational reasons.
Insurance Valuation
Kahneman used the example of certain Americans being provided insurance against their personal death in a terrorist attack while on a trip to Europe, whilst another group was offered insurance that would cover any fatality on the trip. The former group was willing to pay more even though “death of any kind” includes “death in a terrorist attack”.
Kahneman believes that the attribute of fear is being substituted for an evaluation of the complete hazards of travel. These participants were more afraid of terrorism than they were of dying while traveling abroad.
Beautiful Familiarity Effect
Benoit Monin describes a series of tests in which subjects look at images of faces and decide whether they had seen them previously. It has been frequently discovered that attractive faces are more likely to be wrongly identified as familiar.
Monin assesses this finding in terms of attribute substitution. The heuristic quality in this example is a “warm glow”; a good feeling toward someone that could be related to their familiarity or attractiveness. This approach has been criticized since beauty does not explain all of the variance in the familiarity data.
References:
- Kahneman, Daniel; Frederick, Shane (2002). Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment. In Thomas Gilovich; Dale Griffin; Daniel Kahneman (eds.). Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 49–81. ISBN 978-0-521-79679-8
- Kahneman, Daniel (December 2003). Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics. American Economic Review. 93 (5): 1449–1475.
- Kahneman, Daniel; Frederick, Shane (2004). Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment. In Mie Augier; James G. March (eds.). Models of a man: essays in memory of Herbert A. Simon. MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-01208-9
- Monin, Benoît; Oppenheimer, Daniel M. (2005). Correlated Averages vs. Averaged Correlations: Demonstrating the Warm Glow Heuristic Beyond Aggregation. Social Cognition. 23 (3): 257–278. doi: 10.1521/soco.2005.23.3.257
- Sunstein, Cass R. (2005). Moral Heuristics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 28 (4): 531–542. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X05000099